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ABSTRACT 
Information security is becoming a prime concern for individuals and organizations. This is 
especially true in healthcare settings where widespread adoption of integrated health 
information systems means that a vast amount of highly sensitive information on patients is 
accessible through many interaction points across the care delivery network.  
In this research in progress, we seek to uncover how individuals react when they perceive that 
their security environment is stressful. To do so, we conducted a case study using an inductive 
approach based on semi-structured interviews with 41 participants. The preliminary analysis 
of some of our interviews showed that too much security in a health setting can bring in 
negative consequences like evoking negative emotions in users toward the system, increased 
dissatisfaction, and increase of inappropriate workarounds, which can lead to ineffective 
usage of the system and eventually can put patients’ health at risk. 
Keywords: Patients’ health information, information security, health information systems, 
qualitative research. 
INTRODUCTION 
In today’s increasingly digital business environment, information security is becoming a 
prime concern for individuals and organizations. This is especially true in healthcare settings 
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where widespread adoption of integrated health information systems means that a vast amount of 
highly sensitive information on patients is accessible through many interaction points across the 
care delivery network. Indeed, such widespread access has facilitated and dramatically 
intensified security violations from potential harmers, both intended and unintended (Stahl et al. 
2012). It is estimated that the legal settlements alone arising from security violations and issues 
cost the US healthcare sector over $6 billion per year (Appari & Johnson 2010). 
Because people are the weakest link in fending off such security threats (Lowry & 
Moody 2015), organizations are increasingly investing in security mechanisms and policies that 
encourage security compliance. Not surprisingly, this has spawned a vast area of research aimed 
at uncovering the factors that influence compliance intentions and behaviors among individuals. 
Studies have focused on antecedent factors of compliance (Straub 1990; von Solms & von Solms 
2004; Warkentin et al. 2006), non-compliance (e.g., Hu et al. 2011; Myyry et al. 2009; Siponen 
& Vance 2010;), or both (Lowry & Moody 2015). Common across these studies is an implicit 
assumption that increased security is always beneficial. However, it is possible that individuals 
who perceive their security environment to be taxing would react in ways that undermine the 
organization’s intended security goals. While this notion that implementing security policies can 
trigger negative consequences has received some support (e.g., d’Arcy et al. 2014), our 
understanding of how individuals react when they perceive security to be a burden remains quite 
limited. In particular, little is known about the emotional, cognitive, and behavioral 
consequences and interactions between these factors. Therefore, our research question is: How 
do individuals react to a stressful IS security environment? We conceptualize a stressful security 
environment as one where there is a misfit between the characteristics of the person and the 
environment (Cooper et al. 2001). This can occur when the security environment creates unmet 
personal needs or preferences, or when it creates demands that exceed personal abilities. Our 
research setting is the healthcare sector. 
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BACKGROUND 
It is widely agreed that IS security extends beyond technical aspects (Stahl et al. 2012). 
Following Dhillon & Torkzadeh (2006), we define IS security as “the protection of information 
resources of a firm, where such protection could be through both technical means and by 
establishing adequate procedures, management controls, and managing the behavior of people” 
(p. 299). From the perspective of the employee, we use the term IS security environment to refer 
to one’s perception of these technical, social, and organizational dimensions of IS security. 
We briefly review three categories of IS security studies. The first category encompasses 
a large area of IS security research, which has focused on factors that determine one’s 
compliance or non-compliance to IS security policies. Drawing on various theoretical 
perspectives (e.g., deterrence theory; protection motivation; neutralization), these studies have 
shown that perceptions of sanctions increase compliance or reduce violations to IS security 
policies (e.g., d’Arcy et al. 2009; Kankanhalli et al. 2003; Straub 1990). More recently, it has 
been suggested that deterrence may not be an ideal predictor of compliance behaviors, especially 
in the presence of other determinants such as moral factors or neutralizing cognitions (e.g. 
d’Arcy et al.’s 2009; Myyry et al. 2009; Siponen & Vance 2010). The second category of studies 
has sought to uncover different types of IS security behaviors. For example, Schultz (2002) 
developed a framework for understanding and predicting intentional and unintentional insider 
attacks. Similarly, Stanton et al. (2005) developed a taxonomy of security behaviors based on 
two underlying dimensions and their combinations: level of expertise and the intentionality of 
behavior. The third category shows that the IS security environment can also trigger negative 
consequences. For example, drawing on reactance theory, Lowry & Moody (2015) argued that IS 
security policies can undermine individual freedom and create an adverse state of arousal (i.e. 
reactance), which reduced compliance intentions.  
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We make several observations. First, all studies from the first and third categories looked 
at antecedents of compliance rather than the inner working of the compliance construct or its 
consequences. Studies from the second category address this issue partially by developing 
frameworks of non-compliant behavior. Second, compliance and non-compliance are considered 
as a uniform behavior or intention. However, non-compliance can comprise multiple dimensions 
of IS use (e.g., ineffective use; hindering creative use), some of which may extend beyond 
behavioral acts (e.g., emotional reactions such a frustration from the IS security environment; 
cognitive aspects; etc.). Third, most empirical results are based on scenario-based analysis (e.g., 
d’Arcy et al. 2009; Hu et al. 2011; Myyry et al. 2009; Siponen & Vance 2010). While this 
method has been well validated, it faces challenges with establishing ecological validity. This 
suggests a need to complement the extant research with studies in real-life settings where 
individuals have to face actual IS security issues and consequences that have a direct bearing on 
their work environment. Our study extends the existing literature by examining how individuals 
react to a stressful IS security environment. While non-compliance is one potential outcome that 
can occur (d’Arcy et al. 2014), stress research suggests there is likely to be a richer set of 
consequences including emotional, cognitive, and behavioral processes and their interactions. 
Addressing these issues is very important, given that the lack of fit between the characteristics of 
the environment and the individual can reduce compliance intentions (D’Arcy et al. 2014) and 
also lead to a set of other consequences such as reduced job satisfaction (Ragu-Nathan et al. 
2008) and well-being (Cooper et al. 2001). 
METHOD 
As there is limited theoretical understanding on how individuals react to a stressful IS 
security environment, we used a qualitative and exploratory approach to investigate this issue. 
More precisely, we conducted a case study using an inductive approach based on semi-structured 
interviews with 41 participants. Case study research method has been used extensively in IS 
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qualitative research (Darke, Shanks & Broadbent, 1998). For this research, the type of case study 
is exploratory as we are studying a situation that has no clear outcomes yet (Yin, 2003). This 
approach is particularly appropriate for this research project as conducting semi-structured 
interviews provides a rich understanding of security practices that are implemented in a hospital 
and their consequences on individuals.  
Context 
The healthcare setting for this case study was a two-hospital institution that uses multiple 
health information systems. The main system is an electronic health record system that handles 
the administrative and clinical aspects of care during a patient’s stay at the hospital. Actors 
dealing with patient care (e.g., physicians; nurses; administrative staff) from admission to release 
of the patient have access to this system. They enter data at their level which is then immediately 
available to all authorized care providers through the electronic medical records.  
Data Collection 
In collaboration with the top management of the hospitals, we selected participants based 
on their job description and their use of the information systems in the hospitals. It was important 
to select participants with different functions and different levels of interactions with the 
systems, the patients, and the patients’ health information. Participants were categorized in two 
main groups: medical and administrative (see Table 1 below).  
Table 1. Participants of semi-structured interviews 
Position Number of Participants per Position 
Medical position 
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By medical participants, we mean those involved with patient care, such as doctors or 
nurses. By administrative participants, we mean those who are not involved with medical 
practice of patient care such as hospital managers, IT personnel, etc. On rare occasions, there 
was crossover between these areas, where a medical doctor was currently holding a fulltime 
administrative position. In that case, we took the point of view of their current position for the 
analyses.  
Participants were interviewed for about 30 minutes using a semi-structured interview 
protocol. The interview protocol had three main groups of questions: how health information 
systems are used by participants; participants’ perceptions about IS security; how they cope with 
their IS security environment. The qualitative data collection lasted two months.  
PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
A preliminary analysis of the interviews revealed some interesting results about the 
negative consequences of security practices and policies to care providers and patients.  
Evoking negative emotions, which results in dissatisfaction with the system 
One of the common practices that the hospital advised strongly to employees was to log 
off from the system after each usage. This practice had been in place to prevent undesired access 
to patients’ information. However, this evoked strong negative emotions in care providers, which 
resulted in non-compliance behavior. The act of logging in and out was very frustrating for some 
of our participants. For example, a surgeon stated: « Imagine you operate on ten patients, if you 
have to close your login session every time you do a surgery, and you come back you retype 
everything. At the end of the day, you will be sick of all of this.” (P 13) 
Moreover, too much security made the usage of the system slow and difficult, which in 
some cases decreased care-providers’ motivation to use the system. For example, one of the 
technical staff explained: “Security is good but it should not become a big constraint because 
that's why things take longer… ah, there are many passwords, we need to remember all our 
Savoli et al./ Too Much of a Good Thing? Negative Consequences of Information Security in a Healthcare Setting 
 
Proceedings of the 11th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Dublin, Ireland December 10, 2016 
 
passwords ... security is a constraint but it should not be too big a constraint, otherwise it 
penalizes the usage of products. That's for sure.” (P.16). The negative feelings increased 
dissatisfaction with the system, which in turn triggered some levels of resistance towards it.  
Ineffective usage of the system and putting patients’ health at risk 
To cope with the frustration due to too much security, some of the participants left their 
login sessions open, although they knew that this might increase security risks: This finding is in 
line with D’Arcy et al.’s (2014) observation that employees cope with the stress created from 
burdensome security policies by deliberately violating such policies. It is not surprising that you 
leave your login session open. It is not due to negligence; it is because you say "after all, damn, I 
will not retype my password today for the twentieth time. It is their job to make sure it works 
properly.”(P 13). Leaving login sessions open not only facilitates unauthorized access to 
patients’ information, but can also yield mistakes such as through erroneous data entry by others. 
This will prevent traceability of information, which can be dangerous for patients. For example, 
an intern can add a prescription to a patient file in the name of a specialist. Since nurses or other 
physicians might not know the prescription was given by the intern, they might skip any further 
verifications to check for possible mistakes, which can put patients’ health at risk.    
Limiting creative usage of the system 
Another observed negative consequence was that a stressful security environment was 
limiting creative usage of the system. Based on security chart of the hospital, it was not allowed 
that care-providers send patients’ medical information to each other. However, some nurses and 
doctors developed a creative practice by which they would use their smartphones to 
communicate about the health status of patients. For example, nurses would send wound images, 
or medical test results directly to doctors using their smartphones. Doctors also sent them their 
diagnoses and advices through the same medium. This practice was considered unsafe by the 
hospital and was subsequently banned, which was perceived negatively by the care providers. 
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In sum, the preliminary analysis of some of our interviews showed that a stressful 
security environment in a health setting can result in emotional, cognitive, and behavioral 
processes like evoking negative emotions in users toward the system, increased dissatisfaction, 
limiting creative usage of IT, and increase of inappropriate workarounds, which can lead to 
ineffective usage of the system and eventually can put patients’ health at risk. 
CONCLUSION 
As discussed earlier, the goal of this research-in-progress paper is to investigate how 
individuals react to a stressful IS security environment in a health care setting. While non-
compliance (i.e. a behavioral consequence) is one potential outcome that has been observed in 
extant literature, our preliminary findings showed that there is likely to be a richer set of 
emotional, cognitive, and behavioral effects on care providers. By studying these effects and 
their interactions, we aim to create a better picture of the whole process and answer how people 
react to a stressful security environment and how that might influence care-providers, patients, 
and hospitals. This knowledge can eventually help us to design security control mechanisms 
which are not perceived stressful while providing adequate IS security. 
Future steps of this project are to conduct more interviews and observations to code data 
primarily based on “emotional”, “cognitive”, and “behavioral” dimensions of IS security. Since 
the study is inductive in nature, we are open to finding new categories and codes along the way. 
Then, we will analyze our data and draw conclusions by category as we would like to see how 
these categories interact and if the medical group experiences the same challenges as the 
administrative group. We will form a process model to explain the processes that unfold, their 
interactions, and their long term effects.
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